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CHAPTER 12 
PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO DECOUPLING FARMER 
SUPPORT: THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE 
Doren Chadee~ Ronnie Horesh** and R WM Johnson** 
INTRODUCTION 
Government intervention in agriculture in most industrialised countries 
has led to substantial increases in the output of agricultural products over 
the last twenty years. As a result, most agricultural producers and exporters 
have made aggressive use of border measures and subsidies in order to cope 
with surplus agricultural products. By the early 1980's government 
expenditures on agricultural support programmes had reached 
unprecedented levels in most western countries. Increasing pressure on the 
treasuries of these countries led to a commitment on their behalf for 
reforming agricultural production and trade. This commitment was 
formalised when agriculture was explicitly included in the GATT Uruguay 
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN's) launched in 1986. 
With the Uruguay Round now drawing to its end, it has become obvious 
that progress in world agricultural trade liberalisation has been quite 
modest. Part of the reason for the slow progress lies in the fact that 
agricultural trade liberalisation involves modifications of existing domestic 
policies. These policies differ widely across countries and a common 
measuring yardstick for the purpose of comparison has not been agreed 
upon yet. As such it has been extremely difficult to reach any concensus 
on implementing changes on a multilateral basis. Secondly, drastic changes 
to programmes that are designed to support and stabilise the income of 
farmers can be quite difficult to implement from both an economic and 
a political standpoint. 
Unlike most other OECD countries, New Zealand has almost completed 
a unilateral liberalisation of its agricultural sector. In this paper, we outline 
the New Zealand experience at implementing these reform measures, how 
• Centre for Agricul!ural Policy Studies, Massey University, Palmerston North. 
** Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington, New Zealand. 
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they were achieved and what the current situation is. Hopefully, the New 
Zealand experience will provide some guidance to others on decoupling 
agricultural support from production and some of the challenges that such 
reform represent. 
Part 1 of this paper briefly overviews the concept of decoupled support. 
Part 2 looks at the objectives of decoupled support, and how these would 
condition its definition for the purposes of any agreed GATT disciplines. 
Some of the disadvantages of decoupled policies are discussed; the Producer 
Entitlement Guarantee scheme is described and the issue of whether 
developed and developing countries should be treated differently is briefly 
examined. Part 3 overviews the New Zealand experience at decoupling 
agricultural support followed by some concluding remarks in the last 
section. 
DECOUPLING: AN OVERVIEW 
Decoupling generally refers to any form of support to farmers where such 
support does not exert influence on production or factors of production. 
The level of output produced is independent of the amount of support 
delivered by a fully decoupled assistance measure. Decoupled support is 
consistent with market orientation in that it does not affect farmers' 
decisions about how much to produce. It does not interfere with trade, 
or in any way distort trade patterns. Its main objective is to support incomes 
and this it does in a more direct, and less trade-distorting way, than market 
price support or border protection. Decoupled support also has the 
advantage that it does not suppress demand for agricultural products as 
does market price support. 
The concept of the decoupled subsidy has received a lot of attention in 
the GATT Uruguay Round of MTN's for agriculture and could continue 
to grow in importance beyond this Round. It is an agreed objective of the 
Round that disciplines may be agreed upon, eventually, to monitor and 
to gradually reduce the assistance delivered by agricultural support policies. 
Decoupled subsidies, however, may be exempted from some of these 
disciplines. In this respect, decoupled forms of assistance are likely to 
become a more important source of support for the agricultural sector in 
the future. 
Before examining further the definition of decoupled assistance it is 
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instructive to overview briefly the current situation with respect to 
agricultural support in the OECD member countries and the potential 
economic gains from a widespread movement from coupled toward 
decoupled support. 
Currently, market price support and deficiency payments account for nearly 
75 percent of total support to farmers in the OECD countries (OECD 1989). 
These forms of support have led to a panoply of widely documented 
resource allocation distortions, losses of economic efficiency, heightened 
trade tensions, and ~omestic budgetary, environmental and food quality 
problems (OECD 1987, 1988 and Body 1987). The bulk of the assistance 
they offer goes to the larger farmers, and they also tend to destabilize world 
markets. The costs of coupled support then, are borne widely, and not 
least by the developing countries. 
General economic policies in many less developed countries (LDC's) also 
tend to discriminate against agriculture. For instance, taxes on farm output 
tend to create a bias against the agriculture sector. Governments in LDC's 
usually attempt to off set such biases using price stabilisation policies, input 
subsidies and consumer subsidies (World Bank 1986). Previous studies have 
shown that such policies tend to be inefficient. Those LDC's which have 
a bias in favour of agriculture tend to use border measures to achieve this 
result. 
The question that arises then relates to the potential benefits that a shift 
towards decoupled support hase to offer. Recent studies indicate that 
developed countries would benefit significantly from such a shift. A recent 
OECD study has estimated that if all border measures in the six main 
OECD agricultural trading countries or regions (Australia, Canada, EC, 
Japan, New Zealand and the US) in 1986-88 were removed and the same 
levels of budgetary support given to farmers via direct payments, such a 
shift in the composition of farm support policies could yield gains to 
consumers equivalent to 0.8 percent of their real income (OECD 1989/90). 
Given that agriculture and food processing together account for only about 
6 percent of total OECD output this represents a significant gain in 
efficiency. 
Similarly, another study has estimated that if the OECD countries had 
cut their tariffs on agricultural commodities by 50 percent, developing 
countries' income would have increased by US$922 million in 1977 and 
their export revenues by almost US$6 billion. Total export revenue would 
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have risen by 11 percent; exports of low-income countries would have risen 
by 8.5 percent (Valdes and Zietz). Since the level of protection in the OECD 
countries has increased since 1977 the benefits of liberalisation would clearly 
be substantially greater to-day. 
Further evidence of substantial gains from widespread decoupled support 
in LDC's has been provided by Tyers and Anderson. This particular study 
has estimated that developing countries, as a group, would gain 
approximately US$28.2 billion if they, alone, liberalised. Their study 
simulated the effects of removing distortions in border prices by 16 
individual and four regional groups of developing countries, and removal 
of overvalued exchange rates. 
Clearly, significant gains are to be achieved by shifting from coupled to 
decoupled support for farmers. Yet, as the OECD points out in a recent 
report (OECD 1990), 'In only a few [OECDJ countries are there direct 
income measures which are generally unrelated to outputs or inputs in 
production'. The reasons for the slow shift from coupled to decoupled 
support system for agriculture are outlined below. 
DEFINITION OF DECOUPLED SUPPORT 
The pure decoupled subsidy would be paid to farmers in such a way that 
it would not exert influence on any of their decisions which affect output. 
There are several problems with this tentative definition. An exploration 
of the issues may lead to a more practical and operationally useful 
definition. 
The first issue relates to the definition of 'farmers', that is, the question 
of who is to receive the support? One consideration is whether farmers 
are to be treated differently from others. If not, the issue of the definition 
of 'farmer' does not arise. But because farmers have been recipients of 
coupled support in the past it may be thought politically realistic to disburse 
decoupled assistance solely to 'farmers1• Furthermore, farmers in the 
developed countries typically own too many assets to qualify for benefits 
under most schemes intended for the general population. A means of 
deciding who is a farmer for the purpose of receiving decoupled support 
may therefore be required. 
For this purpose 'farmers' may be defined in terms of the time they spend 
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farming, or the proportion of income received from farming. In either case, 
would-be recipients of support would have an incentive to produce. Also, 
it may be undesirable for environmental and other reasons, to attempt to 
remove all forms of support payable to farmers in marginal areas who, 
in the absence of any support, would leave the land. Decoupled support 
would ideally be limited to those who had received coupled support in the 
past, or who are currently oq the land, whether or not they are producing 
anything (though token amounts may be permitted). 
Note though that being on the land, or having received coupled support 
in the past, are necessary but need not be sufficient qualifications for the 
receipt of decoupled support: receipt can also be made contingent on other 
factors such as the undertaking of conservation or land improvement 
projects. 
Another problem with the definition given above concerns 'decisions 
affecting output': the amount of each farmer's decoupled subsidy should 
be totally independent of the volume of output that he or she produces 
(or intends to produce) currently and in the future. This last qualification 
is important: a subsidy could still be decoupled if it were paid to farmers 
on the basis of past levels of production as long as it does not influence 
future levels of production. However, a policy cannot be classified as 
decoupled if benefits to farmers are correlated with the volume of inputs 
purchased after the implementation of the policy. 
A subsidy, therefore, could be defined as 'decoupled' provided it is payable 
in an amount independent of inputs and outputs produced in the season 
for which the subsidy is paid, or in future seasons. This independence is 
to be over the entire range of each farmer's potential production, from 
zero output upwards. If a subsidy is to be considered decoupled the farmer 
will receive the same amount of subsidy regardless of whether he or she 
decides to produce nothing (or a token amount) or whether he or she 
decides to produce something. 'Output' here means agricultural output, 
and should also be taken to refer to any product, marketable or not, which 
can be used as an input into the production of any agricultural product. 
The implications of this definition are examined further by considering 
four policy examples. 
(1) Exit Grants: These are paid to farmers on condition that they retire 
permanently from farming. These grants would be the ideal example of 
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the decoupled subsidy. 
(2) Research and Development (R+D): Bona fide research programmes 
undoubtedly affect farm production in various ways. One of the most 
common impact of R&D on farm firms is that R&D effectively reduces 
the firm's average cost of production. But the relationship between 
expenditure on R + D and supply is difficult to identify, not only for 
analysts, but for farmers themselves. It is this latter point that is important: 
as far as farmers are concerned they will appear to receive the same (zero) 
benefit from most bona fide R + D expenditure if they produce nothing 
as they would if they produce something. This is a result of the national 
nature of most R + D programmes. Benefits are widely distributed over 
many farmers, and take a long time to materialise. 
Nevertheless policies which are designed both to support farmers in ways 
which will induce a supply response and to appear to be R + D programmes 
are not beyond the scope of the imagination. Programmes which are sub-
national in scope would be particularly suspect. Decoupled R + D 
programmes would be precompetitive and the information they generate 
would be publicly available. It is important that R + D, and other categories 
of expenditure which are agreed in the GATT to be 'decoupled', be 
monitored, and disciplines imposed on policies which contravene the spirit 
of any liberalisation agreement. 
(3) Canada's Western Grains Stabilisation Act guarantees the aggregate 
net cash flow of Canadian cereal farmers at a level not below the previous 
five-year average. Participation is voluntary and the Federal Government 
contributes two-thirds of its costs. Because this subsidy is paid not 
according to price, but according to the difference between actual income 
and the average of past years' levels it has been argued that it is a decoupled 
subsidy. 
This argument is difficult to sustain. In any one season the government's 
contribution to the farmer is equivalent to two-thirds of the difference 
between the farm's cash flow and the five-year average. The five-year average 
cash flow will be closely correlated to the volume of production in the 
previous five years. By expanding production farmers can expect to raise 
their five-year average cash flow, and so increase the government subsidy 
when a shortfall occurs. 
The WGS programme appears to contravene the objective of the Cairns 
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Group for agriculture in that market signals to farmers are significantly 
attenuated by the government subsidy element of the scheme. It is also 
clear that this programme falls outside the boundaries of the definition 
of 'decoupled' offered above: in seasons where their cash flow falls short 
of the five-year average farmers would receive more of the government 
subsidy component by producing more output. 
(4) Supply Management: While the definition of decoupled support given 
above serves to exclude price support policies from the 'decoupled' category 
of policy, we need also to consider the joint interaction of price supports 
with supply controls. Where supply controls are binding an increase in the 
support price will not induce an increase in supply, if, as is usually the 
case, the support price is already higher than the world price. Should such 
product price increases be classified as decoupled subsidies and therefore 
be exempt from any agreed disciplines on non-decoupled policies? Product 
price increases of this nature would entrench existing production patterns 
in subsidising countries and so inhibit movement toward market-oriented 
trade. Furthermore, the impacts on farmers' decision making for instance, 
would distort production and potentially trade. In this respect, supply 
management programmes could be classified as coupled. Genuinely 
decoupled policies would not encourage farmers to maintain production 
at levels beyond those evoked by world market prices. If governments require 
the effect on incomes that price increases under supply controls would 
generate they could simply transfer funds to farmers at levels proportional 
to their past output. 
The above examples make it clear that support policies form a continuum 
between the totally coupled and the totally decoupled. The suggested 
definition given above draws the line at the point where the connection 
between increased output and increased subsidy becomes obvious to farmers 
and so critically influences their production decisions. However it may be 
more helpful, in advancing the GAIT negotiations, to list a narrow category 
of policies which would be classified as decoupled, as well as to attempt 
to define, as far as possible, criteria for such policies. Equally pertinent 
is the fact that this point on the continuum is fairly easy to identify. But 
it is not a foolproof definition. Ideally therefore all subsidies should be 
subject to agreed reduction disciplines with ad hoc exclusions granted only 
for genuinely decoupled support, of which bona fide research and 
development would be an example. 
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PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF DECOUPLING 
Although it is widely accepted that by decoupling farm programmes from 
production there are substantial gains to be made both in developed and 
in less developed countries, many countries prefer to bear the costs 
associated with coupled policies by maintaining the status quo. Then the 
question arises as to why most countries do not move towards decoupled 
support policies. From governments' point of view decoupled payments 
have several practical disadvantages. These include: 
* inter-sectoral distribution - in contrast to market price support, 
decoupled payments are made in the form of explicit payments to 
farmers, however defined. Their visibility, and the fact that they will 
be made independently of output, would raise questions about why 
people in other sectors, who might be equally poor, receive no such 
payments. 
* eligibility within the farm sector - again, in contrast to market price 
support policies, decoupled payments require governments to specify 
the recipients. Criteria could be based on income levels, or on a 
requirement to fulfil certain conditions; for example, land conservation 
or withdrawal of resources from farm production. In any case, invidious 
choices as to which farmers shall receive the payments will have to be 
taken. 
* new policies, and associated administrative procedures, would have to 
be set up to replace established ones. 
* the supply response to new support systems may be uncertain. 
It may be politically unrealistic to expect widespread adoption of schemes 
which were not correlated at all with the income lost from the removal, 
or progressive reductions, of coupled support. With schemes which replace 
coupled support by assistance decoupled from past as well as future 
production there would be enormous practical problems in determining 
by how much to compensate farmers. This problem is more complicated 
than determining the revenue lost from the removal of coupled support. 
It requires assessment of the alternative uses of farm resources. Some, 
mostly the bigger farms, would have more opportunities for diversification 
out of agriculture than others. Invidious judgements would have to be made 
about the extent of the alternative income sources enjoyed by (or open to) 
the farm household, though there could, as in New Zealand, be ex-post 
assessment of actual taxable income levels. 
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If new forms of inconie support were not intended to compensate, to some 
degree, for the amount by which a farmer's coupled assistance is reduced, 
then those farmers currently producing large volumes, and so benefiting 
most from price supports, would become big losers. These farmers would 
exert strong political opposition to any agreement which targeted subsidies 
correlated to past production. Opposition would be further incited by the 
highly visible nature of income support schemes not linked to production. 
Several direct income payment schemes that have been proposed within 
the OECD are likely to be afflicted by problems of this sort. 
PRODUCTION ENTITLEMENT GUARANTEE - PEG 
The Production Entitlement Guarantee (IATRC 1988) may provide a useful 
half way house between existing price support schemes and fully decoupled 
support. The PEG is a preset limit on the quantity of production eligible 
to receive support payments. This limit mu~t be less than would be produced 
in response to market prices. For large farms only a fraction of their total 
production would receive support payments and the rest would be sold 
at the open market price. Most of the production of small farms, though, 
would be supported. Under this scheme, therefore, only the quantity of 
output over the level which is eligible for support would be determined 
by its value on the world market. The PEG scheme has several merits 
(Blandford and de Gorter): 
* the total amount of price support can be reduced 
* support can be more readily and flexibly targeted at smaller farms 
* farmers are encouraged to produce efficiently, both within and beyond 
their guaranteed level 
* as a commodity-based policy it may be politically more acceptable than 
fully decoupled lump sum type payments. 
PEGs can be made tradeable. Because they would be more valuable to low-
cost rather than high-cost farmers the latter could be bought out by their 
more efficient neighbours. New entrants to farming would either have to 
purchase (or lease) PEGs or produce all their output at world market prices, 
without PEG payments. If PEGs were not tradeable they would freeze 
existing production patterns and so lead to efficiency losses. 
The first step under a PEG scheme would be to phase out all border and 
domestic support measures. Then the support price, and the quantity of 
181 
Decoupling Farmer Support in New Zealand 
production entitled to receive support would be fixed. The initial issue of 
PEGs would be at the discretion of national governments but may need 
to be negotiated internationally to conform with any' GATT disciplines on 
internal support. 
However, in keeping with its status somewhere between fully coupled and 
decoupled assistance, the PEG scheme has several problems, common to 
both coupled and decoupled support: 
* PEGs would not be immune from political pressure to increase assistance 
if there were a downturn in market prices. 
* PEGs, in common with decoupled support generally, involve highly 
visible budgetary support, rather than by taxing consumers. 
* PEGs for each farm would have to be decided involving complex and 
invidious decisions. 
* Output up to the PEG would have to be monitored for each farm, so 
that it can receive the assisted price. 
SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT (S+D) FOR 
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
Another important issue related to decoupled support involves the 
treatment of less developed countries. Two questions are relevant here: 
(1) how are bona fide infrastructural programmes which benefit the 
agriculture sector to be regarded? and 
(2)shou1d such programmes be treated differently for LDC's? 
There is likely to be a difference of degree of concentration between 
infrastructural programmes and R + D expenditure. The latter is generally 
channelled through national research and extension agencies. The 
relationship between R + D expenditure and production incentives is thereby 
obscured, in the eyes of the farmer. 
With infrastructural programmes, however, the relationship is not 
necessarily so obscure. Many infrastructural programmes would channel 
benefits to only small groups of producers, according to their location, 
range of products or other distinguishing characteristic. Particularly 
questionable would be sub-national expenditure targeted at inputs whose 
use is closely correlated with output. Nevertheless we should not want to 
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see bona fide programmes, particularly those in LDC's, subject to the same 
disciplines as the more obvious supply-inducing policies. 
The solution may therefore be, as with research and development 
expenditure, to monitor all infrastructural support, with particular scrutiny 
given to those programmes which have an agricultural bias and those which 
are sub-national in scope. This monitoring process would probably require 
a greater degree of transparency than is current for policies of this.type. 
In particular the conditions for qualification for infrastructural support 
should be explicit. Further, if a developed country's infrastructural 
programme is to be classified as decoupled the onus would be on that 
country's government to show that more than x percent of the country's 
farmers will benefit, and that more than y percent of the benefits will accrue 
to non-farmers. The rationale for such a criterion is that if x and y are 
sufficiently high the· programme would be an inefficient way of giving 
coupled support to farmers and any supply response would be fairly small. 
A criterion expressed in this way, perhaps with lower values for x and y, 
could also be used for LDC's. It is envisaged that LDC's would be so 
defined according to objective criteria (such as GDP per head) and that, 
as they become more developed they would follow the same discipline 
applying to developed countries. 
DECOUPLED SUBSIDIES IN NEW ZEALAND: WELFARE GRANTS 
The welfare schemes that are currently available to the rural sector in New 
Zealand are described in this section followed by a short discussion of 
whether such support is independent of production incentives. The schemes 
described below are the most evident ones currently available to farmers 
as well as to the general public in some cases. There may be other categories 
not presently evident to the authors. For the purposes of the following 
discussion, it is useful to distinguish between: 
(1) persons in employment (with minimum hours per week for part-time 
employed); 
(2) persons unemployed but seeking work; 
(3) persons with children; and 
(4) self-employed proprietorsindividual taxpayers 
(a) non-farm 
(b) farming 
( c) drought areas. 
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The range of welfare and income supplements available to farmers as well 
as to the general public are summarised in Table 1. 
In terms of general benefits, it is not possible to identify amounts paid 
to rural people as compared with non-rural people. What is clear is that 
Family Benefit and Family Support are the only benefits payable to families 
irrespective of occupational groups. All other schemes, however, have some 
criteria which target the particular group they are meant to serve. Some 
of the above schemes that are directly or indirectly relevant to the farm 
sector are briefly described below. 
(1) Family Benefit 
A child allowance of $6.00 per week per child is paid as of right to all 
parents on children up to the age of 15 years or, if a full time student, 
up until the end of the year in which 18 years is reached. Arrangements 
are made for lump sum payments up to a period of 52 weeks for first 
children, and children starting school. Prior to l October 1986, the Family 
Benefit could be capitalised and used for home ownership purchase. 
This benefit was drawn by 437 ,287 families in the March year to 1989; 
covering 877,204 children and costing $258.4 million (excluding Family 
Support). This scheme is administered by the Department of Social Welfare 
and does not influence production in any way. 
(2) Family Support 
Family Support is extra income for families caring for their children over 
and above the Family Benefit. It is payable through the tax system as a 
rebate or by direct payment through Social Welfare. Family Support is 
abated for annual incomes before tax of $17,000 per year or more and for 
a 6 child family is eliminated where the family income is over $40,000 per 
year. 
Income tested beneficiaries have their Family Support entitlement 
automatically incorporated by the Department or Social Welfare in their 
benefit. If they receive income from an extra source, this can only be 
assessed by Inland Revenue when their tax return is processed. 
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The expenditures on Family Support were $180.3, $397.3 and $415.5 million 
in 1987, 1988 and 1989 respectively. As in the previous case, Family Support 
is fully decoupled. 
(3) Special Needs Grants for Financial Hardship 
Emergency grants may be granted on grounds of financial hardship to those 
who do not qualify for the ordinary Unemployment Benefit. This payment 
is available to the self-employed and others who have sudden loss of income 
or whose venture may have failed. Assistance is paid through a Special 
Needs Grant. Since farmers cannot qualify for Unemployment Benefit, 
a special assistance programme has been made available to them since 1986, 
as discussed next. Farmers can get grants on a long term basis without 
meeting requirements that recipients must be looking for other work and 
willing and able to take up job offers. Although this scheme places farmers 
at an advantage (sectoral advantage) to other self-employed persons, the 
amount of assistance is not related to the level of farm production. 
(4) Special Assistance to the Farming Sector 
A package for assisting the farming sector due to the downturn in the 
economic climate was· announced by Government on 2 July 1986, with part 
of this package being the provision of Special Needs Grants to farmers 
in order to provide for essential day-to~day living expenses. Grants are made 
available to farmers who are in a critical financial position with no funds 
or no access to funds to meet their day-to-day living expenses. The criteria 
for payment are: 
1. the farming operation is in financial difficulty and is not producing 
sufficient income to meet essential living expenses; 
2. there is no significant off-farm income; 
3. there are no assets unconnected with the farm operation which can 
be readily converted to cash; 
4. a decision has been made to sell the farm and the asking price is 
realistic; or the family is in the active process of evaluating the on-
going viability of the farm. 
Social Welfare believes such grants should not be paid for such purposes 
for longer than 6 months. Applicants must re-apply every 6 weeks. In 1989 
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total expenditure under the Special Assistance to the Farming Sector was 
approximately $319,285. In this case too, the amount of assistance is fully 
decoupled from farm output. 
(5) Adverse Events Family Income Support 
This programme was introduced in November 1988 when the East Coast 
of the South Island was declared an adverse event area due to a prolonged 
drought. This programme is funded by the Ministry of Agriculture, but 
is administered by the Department of Social Welfare. Applicants must be 
resident in the declared adverse event area. The basis of the application 
is a statutory declaration that the applicant is in difficulty because of the 
drought. 
An adverse event area was also declared on the East Coast of the North 
Island due to drought in May 1989. Assistance measures for this area were 
announced in March 1990. These also included Adverse Events Family 
Income Support, but with somewhat different criteria. In 1989 some 3500 
farmers received approximately $22.6 million under this scheme. 
(6) Exit Grants 
At the time of the introduction of the Adverse Events Family Income 
Support Scheme additional government support was provided for non-
viable farmers to encourage them to leave farming. Providing a sale took 
place, the government undertook to ensure that the departing farmer's assets 
were made up to the value of $45,000. Some 300 grants were made under 
this programme. 
DISCUSSION 
This section addresses the question of whether New Zealand's experience 
with welfare grants in agriculture can provide guidance on decoupling 
agricultural assistance from production (and hence trade distorting) 
incentives. Based on the extent of welfare grants available in New Zealand 
and the past experience with production subsidies some conclusions are 
reached on the extent of decoupling in New Zealand agriculture in the 
current policy framework. 
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As pointed out earlier, the ideal decoupled subsidy would be paid to farmers 
in such a way that it would not exert influence on any of their decisions 
which affect output. Subsidy payments could be a recognition of a number 
of social and economic objectives pursued by governments. The EEC argues 
that its subsidies are social in character and hence are not provided for 
economic reasons. Such things as retaining people on the land, preserving 
the countryside and maintaining minimum incomes are all counted as social 
objectives. 
Hence the question that arises is whether countries (like those in the EEC) 
could potentially reach such social objectives by different means than by 
blanket all-embracing support for farm prices. If such could be achieved, 
then production levels and input use might relate more closely to those 
which would have prevailed in the absence of blanket subsidisation. 
In the case of New Zealand the social objectives being pursued at the present 
time include: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
prevention of financial hardship 
protection of the sick, disabled, etc. 
protection of the aged 
assistance in emergencies, including climatic emergencies and recovery 
assistance for economic disasters and recovery 
A review of the government programmes available to the rural sector 
indicates that there does not appear to be an explicit welfare policy for 
rural people in terms of rural population goals or maintaining the 
countryside in its present form. There is also no firm identifiable policy 
for rural communities. The concept is 1Jasically one of a welfare safety net 
for protection of all people at some minimum standard. 
The welfare safety net is necessary, in part, because earlier social and 
economic goals of full employment and balance of payments surpluses 
have been replaced by market and efficiency goals. In a full employment 
society, the minimum standard of living can be delivered by minimum wages 
and job spreading, with less emphasis on delivery by welfare payments. 
Similarly, agricultural assistance directed toward increased exports assisted 
marginal farmers to stay in farming, and also kept people in agriculture 
and rural communities at levels higher than were warranted by undistorted 
market prices and economic necessity. In turn, such assistance kept more 
schools open in rural areas, maintained small businesses in rural 
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communities and maintained levels of services such as health and roading 
at higher than otherwise levels. It is doubtful if these were the open goals 
of such programmes. 
From 1962 to 1984 agricultural assistance policy was dominated by export 
lead growth priorities arising out of the recurrent balance of payments crises 
of the 1950s. For present purposes it is useful to discuss agricultural 
investment incentives separately from guaranteed minimum price schemes. 
These policies were introduced to increase production of exportable goods 
by second best methods in a fixed exchange rate environment. They 
contributed to the defined social objectives outlined above, but only as 
a by-product of their main aims. 
The investment incentives operating in this period were tax write-offs for 
land development, standard values for livestock for tax assessment, the 
Livestock Incentive Grant Scheme (1976) and the Land Development 
Encouragement Loan Scheme (1978). These measures were aimed at the 
developing farmer with scope for greater farm. production. They were 
designed to fund more easily the expansion of output the nation desired. 
In effect, they subsidised the cost of land development through an 
investment incentive. These measures tended to encourage farmers to bring 
more land into production rather than to intensify existing land use. 
During the middle of the period 1962 to 1984, policy measures were 
introduced to provide greater security in farming. Land development was 
seen to be at risk if farmers were uncertain of future returns and sudden 
changes in returns. Their response to such risk factors was thought to be 
a slowing down of the land development process. Minimum price schemes 
had been developed in the immediate post-war period for milkfat, apples, 
meat and wool, with varying degrees of support being provided. In 1976, 
both the meat and wool minimum price support schemes were re-engineered 
to provide higher miniml}.m price guarantees and mechanisms for 
replenishing the necessary buffer funds. In 1978, the Supplementary 
Minimum Price Scheme was introduced whereby milkfat, meat and wool 
prices would be topped up to provide desirable incomes for producers. In 
effect, incomes were designed to be not only secure, but sufficient to 
maintain a high level of re-investment in farm development and output. 
Both the investment incentives and the guarant~ed minimum price schemes 
were oriented to investment, growth and output. Neither were instituted 
for 'welfare' reasons. Both could be said to have slowed down economic 
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adjustment to changing economic circumstances which would otherwise 
have been required as market realities changed. On the other hand, both 
schemes could be said to have encouraged structural adjustment through 
increased and guaranteed incomes and investment incentives which funded 
new opportunities and directions. 
Since minimum prices were applied across the board, they raised incomes 
for all producers and probably protected the weak, the marginal and the 
non-viable. In this sense the support schemes then in place constituted a 
type of social welfare payment to those who would have otherwise been 
a burden on welfare funds. 
Welfare assistance in the form of Direct Income Support to the rural sector 
has increased since 1984 following the dismantling of the investment 
incentives and minimum price schemes, and the general decline in the 
profitability of farming. Universal benefits were available before these 
changes and have continued since. Income smoothing and loss write-offs 
through the tax system have been preserved as well. However as farming 
profitability declined through 1985 and 1986, it became apparent that the 
weak, the marginal and the non-viable farm units were not protected by 
the existing social welfare provisions. As a result, the Special Assistance 
to the Farming Sector Scheme was devised for farmers to meet temporary 
financial distress requirements. 
This was the only mechanism whereby farm owners and their families could 
receive a full welfare benefit. Family Benefit and Family Support for 
children are payments based on the number of children in the family and 
are not designed to maintain the whole family. The Guaranteed Minimum 
Family Income Scheme is restricted to people on low wages and is not 
available to farmers as self-employed. In the case of the South Island 
drought relief scheme, it seems likely that in most cases of natural disaster, 
this kind of welfare assistance would probably be needed whether or not 
production incentives and price support were in place. 
However, farmers in New Zealand remain more vulnerable to climatic and 
financial adversity than they were under previous subsidy programmes. 
Existing schemes do provide some compensation to farmers who are 
adversely affected by natural disasters. However, New ?.ealand's farm sector 
remains highly vulnerable to changes in the external environment. For 
example. fluctuating world commodity prices and the currency exchange 
rates are largely beyond the control of farmers. To the extent that the 
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agricultural sectors in the rest of the world are still highly protected, 
unilaterally decoupling agriculture has introduced new forms of risks into 
agriculture. From a global efficiency standpoint, an interesting question 
that arises is whether New Zealand farmers are receiving the right market 
signals from the rest of the world. Unless the level playing field is achieved, 
market signals (based on international comparative advantage) are bound 
to be distorted. 
Welfare assistance (Direct Income Support) is oriented to financial need 
and is normally targeted to defined groups. Only those programmes 
introduced for relief in the economic downturn could be said to be 
substitutes for earlier production incentives in the sense that while 
guaranteed minimum prices were in place, a special assistance scheme for 
farmers would not be needed. There is no equivalent to the investment 
incentives such as the Livestock Incentive Scheme and the Land 
Development Encouragement Loan Scheme. Social Welfare still view the 
Adverse Events Family Income Support scheme and the Special Assistance 
scheme as subsidies to farming as they believe the conditions are more 
generous than for other sectors. 
Among some of the measures that have been proposed for decoupling 
agricultural support from production the PEG seems to be receiving lots 
of attention. From New Zealand's perspective, PEG could be expensive 
to implement in the sense that additional administrative structures have 
to be set up in order to monitor whether farmers are abiding to their 
respective PEGs. Even for developing countries, monitoring production 
can become an administrative and financial burden. 
Direct income support delivered via the 'welfare' system seems to have 
worked well in New Zealand and the process has been partly facilitated 
by the existing institutional setup. For example the working of direct income 
support scheme can be monitored closely through the existing tax system. 
In this respect, developing countries that do not yet have a well developed 
tax system might ~perience some difficulties in implementing direct income 
support schemes. To the extent that direct income support schemes can 
be fully decoupled and are in general financially and administratively quite 
attractive they should be considered as serious candidates for decoupling 
agricultural support in the rest of the world. 
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CONCWDING REMARKS 
Decoupling farm support programmes from production still represents a 
major challenge to most western nations. There are tremendous political 
and administrative difficulties involved in determining which farmers shall 
receive what level of decoupled support. There are also significant political 
problems associated with switching from a system of price support to 
mechanisms such as direct income support. Any movement away from 
coupled support is also likely to lead to a fall in farmers' asset values. 
In certain ways New Zealand has been more fortunate than other developed 
countries: high support levels have a short history in New Zealand, and 
farming systems did not come to depend on them to the same extent as 
in other countries. This paper has shown that farmers in New Zealand no 
longer receive subsidies that are linked directly to production. It can be 
deduced that when income supporting subsidies were in place, the need 
for targeted welfare assistance was reduced. Once the income supports were 
removed, the need arose for welfare type schemes based on financial need 
and not on production objectives. These welfare schemes provide de-
coupled support for the farming community as defined at the beginning 
of this paper and hence have in effect displaced part of the earlier broad 
assistance provided to agriculture. 
The New Zealand experience has shown that a fully decoupled agricultural 
sector is possible. Farmers can survive the withdrawal of coupled support, 
to the benefit of the wider economy. Nevertheless there have been problems 
and the New Zealand experience can offer some guidance for countries 
wishing to implement decoupled policies. Under previous subsidy 
programmes farmers in New Zealand were insulated from many of the 
problems caused by climatic threats, or changes in the macro economy. 
In the absence of such programmes, governments could usefully encourage 
farmers to adopt risk management techniques such as drought strategies 
and insurance cover for adverse events in order to be better prepared in 
a world of freer trade and market realities. 
As the OECD points out, 'multilateral action should not be seen as 
excluding unilateral action. To do so may involve foregoing the very 
substantial benefits from [agricultural policy] reform simply because of 
an inability of the countries concerned to harmonise their policy changes. 
A move to direct income support could provide such a signal while at the 
same time creating room to manoeuvre for governments in handling the 
social and political costs associated with reductions in assistance.' 
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